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ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW
ARTICI 52- ENFORCEMENT OF MONEY JUDGMENTS
CPLR 5223: Discovery of joint tax returns of judgment debtor who
was outside court's jurisdiction permitted.
CPLR 5223180 has been described as more extensive in scope than
previous discovery statutes.""1 In providing for post-judgment disclo-
sure, it is designed to permit a judgment creditor, aided by the power
of subpoena,182 to ascertain the capacity of a judgment debtor to satisfy
the award entered against him. 88 The judgment creditor is permitted
by the statute to "compel disclosure of all matter relevant to the
satisfaction of the judgment."' 84 In so providing, CPLR 5223 does not
180 CPLR 5223 provides:
At any time before a judgment is satisfied or vacated, the judgment creditor
may compel disclosure of all matter relevant to the satisfaction of the judgment,
by serving upon any person a subpoena, which shall specify all of the parties
to the action, the date of the judgment, the court in which it was entered,
the amount of the judgment and the amount then due thereon, and shall state
that false swearing or failure to comply with the subpoena is punishable as a
contempt of court.
Unlike practice under the CPA, a judgment creditor may normally commence a
disclosure proceeding under CPLR 5223 without court assistance. See 6 WK&M 5223.01.
181 Oates v. Oates, 33 App. Div. 2d 133, 135, 306 N.Y.S.2d 108, 111 (1st Dep't 1969).
In Oates, Justice Capozzoli stated:
There can be no doubt that CPLR 5223 provides for a far broader examination
of a third party than did its predecessor section 782 of the Civil Practice Act.
The latter was limited to an examination of such party concerning property,
money or other means of the judgment debtor for satisfying the judgment. CPLR
5223 is not so limited and expressly permits an examination of a third party to
the extent that he may be compelled to disclose "all matter relevant to the satis-
faction of the judgment."
Id. (Capozzoli, J., concurring). See generally 9 CAuMODY-WArr 2d, § 64:289, at 641 (1966).
182 At least one court in construing CPA 782, the predecessor of CPLR 5223, took
the position that a subpoena should not be quashed merely because it departed from a
specification of that statute, provided that the irregularity did not prejudice the rights
of the individual served. See Ruppert v. Delaney, 184 Misc. 745, 55 N.Y.S.2d 23 (N.Y.C.
City Ct. N.Y. County 1945), wherein the court held that if "the respondent was clearly
informed by the subpoena that attendance in New York County was required . . . any
irregularity in its caption does not affect the validity of the subpoena." Id. at 747, 55
N.Y.S.2d at 25. See also In re Wyman, 76 App. Div. 292, 78 N.Y.S. 546 (3d Dep't 1902);
Zwerdling v. Hamman Bldg. Corp., 145 Misc. 471, 259 N.Y.S. 593 (Sup. Ct. Kings County
1932).
183 See 6 WK&M 5223.05; cf. Kiamesha Concord, Inc. v. Pullman, 52 Misc. 2d 270,
275 N.Y.S.2d 86 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1966). The Pullman court observed that "[t]he
essential function of the disclosure provisions of article 52 of the CPLR ...is . . . to
require . . . [the debtor] to submit to examination for purposes of execution on his
property." Id. at 271, 275 N.Y.S.2d at 88 (emphasis added).
Discovery under CPLR 5223 is not permitted unless a judgment has been entered
against the defendant concerning whom examination is sought. See Gelber v. New York
Cent. Sys., 38 App. Div. 2d 686, 327 N.Y.S.2d 244 (4th Dep't 1971) (mem.); 6 WK&M
5223.04. However, CPLR 5229 allows a trial court, in its discretion, to order an exam-
ination of a potential judgment debtor after a verdict has been rendered, but before
entry of judgment.
184 CPLR 5223. See generally 9 CARMoDY-WArr 2d, § 64:289, at 642 (1966). See also
Trnm, REP. 258, wherein it is stated that
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distinguish between judgment debtors and third parties. Rather, "any
person" may be subject to a post-judgment disclosure proceeding,
including a third party, notwithstanding the fact that such party is not
in possession of property owned by the debtor, nor indebted to him.18 5
The statute merely requires that the information sought from the
third party be relevant to the satisfaction of the judgment. 80
In Siemens & Halkse Gmbh. v. Gres,87 the judgment creditor
subpoenaed the joint tax returns of the judgment debtor and her
husband after the defendant had placed herself beyond the court's
jurisdiction. From an examination of the returns, plaintiff sought to
determine the nature and extent of the defendant's assets. The sub-
poenaed tax returns were in the possession of the defendant's account-
ant, who was subject to the jurisdiction of the court. The accountant
moved to quash the subpoena, or in the alternative, to limit discovery
to the defendant's 1971 and 1972 tax returns. The defendant's hus-
band did not join in this motion, although he did object to the dis-
closure proceeding. 88
The Supreme Court, New York County, concluded that the infor-
mation contained in the joint income tax returns was relevant to the
satisfaction of the plaintiff's judgment. Consequently, the accountant's
motion to quash or limit the subpoena was denied.8 9 In his opinion,
Justice Markowitz emphasized that the defendant's absence'90 had
forced the plaintiff to seek the disclosure of the tax returns held by
the accountant.' 9 ' The court did not directly consider the breach
[t]he phrase "all matters [sic] relevant to the satisfaction of the judgment" in
Section 5223 is ... designed to change the rule of those cases which have held
that examination must be limited to material means for satisfying the judgment.
8 See 6 WK&M 5223.03. Prior to the enactment of CPLR 5223, CPA 779(2) re-
quired that the judgment creditor have reason to believe that the third party he sought
to examine possessed "property of the judgment debtor exceeding ten dollars in value,
or is indebted to him in a like sum .... " See Strand v. Piser, 291 N.Y. 236, 52 N.E.2d
111 (1943); Issacs v. Issacs, 272 App. Div. 326, 70 N.Y.S.2d 644 (Ist Dep't 1947) (per en-
dam); Douglas v. Fassoulis, 17 Misc. 2d 911, 186 N.Y.S.2d 537 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County
1959).
180 See notes 180 & 184 supra.
18777 Misc. 2d 745, 354 N.Y.S.2d 762 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1973), ar'd, 43 App. Div.
2d 1021, 353 N.Y.S.2d 395 (Ist Dep't 1974) (mem.).
188 77 Misc. 2d at 745, 354 N.Y.S.2d at 763. See note 191 infra.
189 Id.
190 CPLR 4501 provides in pertinent part:
A competent witness shall not be excused from answering a relevant question,
on the ground only that the answer may tend to establish that he owes a debt
or is otherwise subject to a civil suit.
Consequently, had the judgment debtor in Gres remained within the jurisdiction of the
court, the existence of a judgment entered against her would not have allowed her to
decline to respond to questions designed to elicit information relevant to the satisfaction
of the judgment. See generally SECOND RP. 89.
191 It should be noted that any assertion by the defendant's husband of an accoun-
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of the nondefendant husband's privacy that would result from the
production of the returns. However, in an apparent reference to this
problem, the court observed that the husband's "willingness to file a
joint return has created an instrument which is both his and his wife's
and subject to production.' 0 2
Although not considered by the court in Gres, the requirement
of CPLR 5223 that the information sought be "relevant to the satis-
faction of the judgment,"'193 does impose limitations upon the power
of the judgment creditor to compel disclosure in a post-judgment
proceeding.194 Little judicial scrutiny has been directed toward defin-
ing the restrictions implicit in the language of the statute. Perhaps the
most thorough analysis of this area was contained in Oates v. Oates,095
wherein Justice McGivern, in a dissenting opinion, expressed concern
that a post-judgment discovery proceeding could become a "fishing
expedition."'9 To avoid such a situation, Justice McGivern suggested
that there be some initial display of the availability and need for the
information sought to be produced before a court should sustain a
subpoena issued under CPLR 5223.17 Two pre-CPLR decisions
reached the same conclusion, although their authority is suspect in
tant-client privilege would have been unavailing, since New York accords no privilege to
communications between an accountant and his client. See In re Rae, 319 F. Supp. 990
(S.D.N.Y. 1970); In re Colton, 201 F. Supp. 13 (S.D.N.Y. 1961), aff'd, 306 F.2d 633 (2d
Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 371 U.S. 951 (1961). A recognized privilege, however, can be in-
voked in post-judgment discovery proceedings. See In re Circle Floor Co., 36 Misc. 2d
634, 233 N.Y.S.2d 158 (Sup. Ct. Queens County 1962); note 194 infra.
192 77 Misc. 2d at 745, 354 N.Y.S.2d at 762. If the husband in Gres had possession
of the joint tax returns in question, he would have been compelled to disclose them.
The weight of authority, state as well as federal, is that a court may require the pro-
duction of a copy of a federal income tax return in a discovery proceeding. See, e.g.,
Jensen v. Boston Ins. Co., 20 F.R.D. 619 (S.D. Cal. 1957); Court DeGraw Theatre, Inc.
v. Loew's, Inc., 20 F.R.D. 85 (E.D.N.Y. 1957); Paramount Pictures, Inc. v. Brandt, 276
App. Div. 1002, 96 N.Y.S.2d 114 (1st Dep't 1950) (per curiam). In Connecticut Importing
Co. v. Continental Distilling Corp., 1 F.R.D. 190, 192 (D.C. Conn. 1940), the court ob-
served that "[i]ncome tax returns . ..have a status no different from other items of
evidence." See also Ocean Accident & Guar. Corp. v. Marcus Contracting Co., 226 App.
Div. 789, 234 N.Y.S.2d 854 (1st Dep't 1929) (mem.).
Furthermore, if the judgment debtor's husband had possession of the tax returns
and, because of a fear of possible criminal prosecution, refused to produce them for
examination on the ground that his privilege against self-incrimination would be vio-
lated, CPLR 5211 would have permitted the court to grant him immunity from state
criminal prosecution. See 6 WK&M 5211.01.
19 See note 180 supra.
194 Any of the recognized privileges can be invoked in a post-judgment exami-
nation to protect confidential information. .. .The evidentiary privileges are
not the only limitations on the scope of disclosure. Trade or business secrets and
matters of a peculiarly personal nature cannot be inquired into unless they are
directly relevant to the satisfaction of the judgment and even then, the court
may impose limitations on the creditor's right of inquiry.
6 WK&M 5211.01.
195 33 App. Div. 2d 133, 506 N.Y.S.2d 108 (1st Dep't 1966).
196 Id. at 138, 306 N.Y.S.2d at 113 (McGivern, J., dissenting).
197 Id.
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light of the liberalization of post-judgment discovery embodied in
CPLR 5223.19s In at least one area, there is no question that restric-
tions upon the use of CPLR 5223 exist. A judgment creditor may not
violate a recognized confidential relationship between the judgment
debtor and the third party whom the creditor seeks to examine.199
The Gres court stated that it was public policy "'to put no ob-
stacle in the path of one seeking to secure the enforcement of a judg-
ment of a court of competent jurisdiction.' "200 Clearly, courts should
assist in the enforcement of such judgments. Other considerations
should be given weight, however, when a judgment creditor attempts
to compel disclosure in a post-judgment proceeding. For example, as
Gres illustrates, a third party's right to privacy can easily be invaded
in such a proceeding. Moreover, CPLR 5223 can be used by a judg-
ment creditor as an instrument of harassment. Ideally, the relevancy
requirement contained in the statute affords a witness some protection
in either of these circumstances. Unfortunately, the existing decisional
law under CPLR 5223 has done little to develop the relevancy re-
quirement as a protective device. The Gres court was presented with
the opportunity to explore this area, but failed to do so. In the future,
courts should be sensitive to the need to more precisely define the
scope of CPLR 5223.
CPLR 5227: Judgment debtor entitled to jury trial in special proceed-
ing brought by judgment creditor.
CPLR 5227 permits a judgment creditor to initiate a special
proceeding against a third party "who it is shown is or will become
195 See Omaha Cold Storage Co. v. Chas. H. Nolte, Inc., 264 App. Div. 740, 34 N.Y.S.2d
433 (2d Dep't 1942) (mem.); In re Schwartz, 175 Misc. 860, 25 N.Y.S.2d 742 (N.Y.C. City Ct.
Kings County 1941). Both Omaha Cold Storage and Schwartz suggested that the judgment
creditor must act on more than mere surmise in seeking to compel production of informa-
tion in a discovery proceeding. However, with the enactment of CPLR 5223, it has been
argued that the more cautious approach to discovery reflected in these two decisions need
not be followed. See 7B MCKINNEY'S CPLR 5224, commentary at 97 (1963). See generally 6
WK&-M 5223.05.
199 See note 194 supra. One such recognized privilege operates in the context of an
attorney-client relationship. See Circle Floor Co. v. Silton Corp., 36 Misc. 2d 634, 233
N.Y.S.2d 158 (Sup. Ct. Queens County 1962). In Silton, the court permitted tie attorney
of the judgment debtor to be examined in a post-judgment proceeding, subject to the
proviso that there be an opportunity "to raise the question of privilege at the point where
it appears that the witness is about to be asked a question which may disclose confidential
communication." Id. at 635, 233 N.Y.S.2d at 160. It should be noted that the attorney-
client privilege has not been extended to situations where an attorney holds the property
or money of his client, without performing professional services. In such circumstances,
the courts believe the attorney merely functions as an agent for the client. See L. Michel
Plumbing & Heating Corp. v. Randall Ave. Theatre Corp., 179 Misc. 998, 39 N.Y.S.2d 830
(N.Y.C. City Ct. N.Y. County 1943).
200 77 Misc. 2d at 745, 354 N.YS.2d at 762, quoting Leonard v. Wargan, 55 N.Y.S.2d
626, 627 (Sup. Ct. Bronx County 1945).
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